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1151 
THE BLUEPRINT: CRITIQUES OF THE FINGERPRINT AND 
ABANDONMENT PARADIGMS UTILIZED TO REJECT AN 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN DNA 
CRIMINAL COURT OF NEW YORK 
NEW YORK CITY 
People v. Vernon B.1 
(decided June 15, 2012) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The defendant, Vernon B., was charged with one count of 
criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree.2  On November 
10, 2011, a police officer allegedly observed the defendant throwing 
a bag from the window of a residence, and upon inspection, he found 
the bag contained a loaded 9mm pistol, which subsequently tested 
positive for male DNA.3  On April 27, 2012, the People filed a mo-
tion under Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) section 240.40 to com-
pel the defendant to submit to an oral swab for DNA testing.4  The 
defendant opposed the motion on both Fourth Amendment and pro-
cedural grounds.5 
The United States Supreme Court and the New York Court of 
Appeals have both determined that a search into a person’s body war-
 
1 35 Misc. 3d 1241(A) (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012). 
2 Id. at 1. 
3 Id. 
4 Id.  See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 240.40(2)(b)(v) (McKinney 2009):  
Upon motion of the prosecutor, and subject to constitutional limitation the 
court . . . may order the defendant to provide non-testimonial evidence.  
Such order may . . . require the defendant to . . . [p]ermit the taking of 
samples of blood, hair or other materials from his body in a manner not 
involving an unreasonable intrusion thereof or a risk of serious physical 
injury thereto. 
5 The defendant argued that the People’s motion was submitted late without good cause, 
and that the People did not establish the required elements of the constitutional standard set 
by the New York Court of Appeals for a valid search for bodily evidence.  Vernon B., 35 
Misc. 3d 1241(a) at 1 (citing to In re Abe. A., 437 N.E.2d 265, 266 (N.Y. 1982)). 
1
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rants the protection of the Fourth Amendment and therefore must be 
conducted reasonably.6  A determination of reasonableness is correla-
tive: greater intrusions require the highest degree of suspicion proba-
ble cause, which is the belief that it more likely than not evidence is 
located in a specific place.7  Lesser intrusions, however, require a 
mere reasonable, articulated suspicion about the presence of evi-
dence.8 
The degree of intrusion associated with a DNA search has 
never been explicitly ruled on by the United States Supreme Court or 
the New York Court of Appeals, likely because of the unique nature 
of DNA.  DNA is a molecule that is present in almost every cell of 
the body, and it contains an individual’s entire genetic structure, a se-
quence comprised of three million unique identifiers that, when com-
pared to a separate molecule of DNA, creates an almost certain pos-
sibility of matching the samples and their donors.9  Because of this 
accuracy, DNA evidence is highly sought after to aid prosecutors in 
obtaining convictions with increasing frequency.10 
The broad power of DNA evidence must be tempered by the 
protections of probable cause and not any lower standard.  This asser-
tion is justified not only by precedent, but also by scientific develop-
ments and common sense concerns affecting DNA evidence.  For ex-
ample, some commentators have suggested that DNA evidence is not 
the infallible gold standard it is generally presumed to be.11  Despite 
possible concerns about DNA, the variety of ways that prosecuting 
authorities can use DNA samples to help marshal evidence is increas-
ing.12  Therefore, it is a troubling prospect to consider the ever grow-
 
6 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966); Abe A., 437 N.E.2d at 266. 
7 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). 
8 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
9 People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y. 1994). 
10 See 35 J.L MED & ETHICS 310 (2007) (finding that as of 2001, 68% of prosecutors re-
ported using DNA evidence at least once in a felony case). 
11 See Kimberly A. Polanco, Constitutional Law- the Fourth Amendment Challenge to 
DNA Sampling of Arrestees Pursuant to the Justice for All Act of 2004, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK. L. REV. 483, 525 (2005) (questioning the reliability of DNA sample analysis quality 
assurance procedures). 
12 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1435 a(a)(1), (c)(1) (2012) (establishing a federal database of DNA 
samples from convicted offenders, and compiling state samples into a national database); 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c (McKinney 2012) (establishing a state database of DNA samples 
seized from convicted offenders).  Some states and the federal government now conduct sei-
zures, and store DNA samples from arrestees, and then compare these samples to evidence 
from both unsolved and future crimes.  See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 
405 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that suspicionless collection of DNA samples from arrestees 
2
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ing intrusions created by DNA seizures and the use of DNA evidence 
at trial.  Recent scientific developments proving that crime scene 
DNA evidence can be fabricated quite easily, as well as other scien-
tific and legal concerns, such as the reliability of analysis and poten-
tial for disclosure of private medical information, demonstrate the in-
trusion of a seizure has grown and may never stop doing so.13  These 
considerations undoubtedly call for a requirement that obtaining 
DNA samples through any means constitutes a search requiring prob-
able cause. 
This case note will discuss a jurisdictional split regarding the 
degree of intrusion created by a DNA seizure.  First, this note will 
present the case law associated with the protective majority approach, 
which analyzes DNA seizures as full intrusions requiring probable 
cause.14  Next, the minority approach will be discussed, which based 
on flawed assertions, interprets the intrusion created by DNA seizures 
as uninvasive.15  Under the minority approach little or no government 
justification is required for a DNA seizure.  The minority reaches this 
result by equating DNA with abandoned material or by characterizing 
it as merely a genetic fingerprint; however, this comparison is inher-
ently unsound.16  Last, it will be demonstrated that the minority ap-
proach is inconsistent with federal precedent and its characterization 
of DNA rests on flawed interpretations of scientific facts.  Correct in-
terpretations of the related law, associated science, and the incorpora-
tion of recent developments will demonstrate that DNA seizures are 
highly intrusive, and therefore must be protected fully by probable 
cause. 
 
II.  THE OPINION:  PEOPLE V. VERNON B. 
 
A.  Facts 
On November 10, 2011, a police officer allegedly observed 
 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
13 See infra Part IV. 
14 See United States v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 55 (E.D.N.Y 1995) (using probable 
cause as the standard for determining the appropriateness of a DNA seizure). 
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the defendant, Vernon B., throwing a bag from the window of a resi-
dence.17  Upon searching the bag, the officer recovered a 9mm pistol 
loaded with one round of ammunition, and the defendant was subse-
quently charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth 
degree.18  The recovered pistol tested positive for the presence of 
male DNA.19  On April 27, 2012, the People sought an order compel-
ling the defendant to provide an oral swab to determine if his DNA 
was a match to the sample found on the pistol.20  The defendant op-
posed the motion asserting, inter alia, that the stringent standards set 
for issuing an order to obtain forensic evidence from a defendant 
were not met.21 
B. The Holding 
The standard for issuing a constitutionally valid order to ob-
tain physical forensic evidence, set by the Court of Appeals in Matter 
of Abe A.,22 requires the prosecution to establish three elements.23  
The first element is probable cause, which requires essentially a 
demonstration it is more likely than not that the defendant committed 
the crime.24  The second element is a clear indication that relevant 
material evidence will be found, and the third element is that the 
method used to secure the evidence is safe and reliable.25  These ele-
ments are based on the bodily search standard first set by the United 
States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California,26 and they have 
been used to govern the constitutionality of DNA searches in New 
York State trial courts.27 
 
17 Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 1. 
18 Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01(1) (providing that “[a] person shall be guilty of 




21 Id.  Defendant also argued that the motion was not submitted within the time period 
prescribed by statute; however, the governing statute, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 240.90 (McKin-
ney 2009), permits the late submission of a discovery motion on good cause, and the Court 
permitted the prosecution to submit the motion because of the date on which it received the 
lab reports for the case.  Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 1. 
22 437 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1982). 
23 Id. at 266. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 270. 
26 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
27 Abe A., 437 N.E.2d at 270 (citing to Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770).  As will be discussed, 
4
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The court in Vernon B. dismissed the defendant’s contentions 
regarding the reasonableness and the likelihood of success regarding 
the proposed search.28  However, the court held that it may be likely 
the People had not established probable cause that the defendant 
committed the crime.29  The court also expressed reservations about 
whether the police officer had probable cause to search the bag 
thrown from the window.30  Because the bag and gun provided the 
only reason to believe the defendant committed the crime, if these 
items were illegally seized, then they must be suppressed and the 
prosecution must be terminated.31  The court found that the possibil-
ity of illegal seizure was very real, and therefore did not issue a ruling 
on the DNA order because of the possibility that the prosecution 
would be terminated.32 
C. The Court’s Reasoning 
The determination of whether probable cause exists is essen-
tial because a request for non-testimonial evidence like the DNA or-
der sought in Vernon B. is akin to a search warrant.33  A motion to 
compel a bodily intrusion, either through a discovery order or search 
warrant, is essentially a judicial determination that probable cause ex-
ists, and this determination must be supported on legally obtained ev-
 
the removal of DNA must be protected by full probable cause as is done in New York State 
courts.  See, e.g., People v. Afrika, 914 N.Y.S. 2d 542, 543 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2010) (rely-
ing on the Abe A. standard to govern the intrusiveness of a DNA search).  However, some 
courts and commentators have argued that DNA searches should be subject to lesser stand-
ards of protection as DNA searches involve little to no intrusion on personal interests.  See 
infra Parts IV, V.  The court in Abe A. went so far as to suggest that any lesser protections 
for bodily searches are not “constitutionally firm.”  Abe A., 265 N.E.2d at 269. 
28 Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 2 (“[T]he only viable challenge that the defense raises to an 
oral swab order under Abe A. is that there is no probable cause because the evidence in this 
case was allegedly seized unlawfully.”). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. (“[I]f the bag, pistol and ammunition had been illegally seized they will be sup-
pressed, and there would be no probable cause, thus resolving the DNA testing issue and, not 
incidentally, terminating the prosecution.”). 
32 Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 2 (“Holding the suppression hearing at this point will there-
fore perhaps prevent an unnecessary physical intrusion into defendant and the delay that 
DNA testing will cause, while at the same time advancing this case towards a resolution.”). 
33 See Abe A., 437 N.E.2d at 266 (setting the standard for the constitutional limitations on 
a search of a defendant’s body). 
5
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idence only.34  Therefore, an order to search a defendant’s body, 
founded upon probable cause, is “properly issued [when] the applica-
tion contain[s] sufficient lawfully obtained information, untainted by 
and independent of alleged illegally obtained evidence” to support 
the determination.35  Warrantless searches are typically presumed un-
reasonable and impermissible, unless exigent circumstances necessi-
tate the action and overcome this presumption.36 
While the court in Vernon B. did not decide the issue of prob-
able cause, the court discussed several cases with similar facts that 
informed its ultimate conclusion that suspension of the proceedings 
was necessary until this determination was made.37  In the first group 
of cases, the officer’s presence on the property was equivalent to a 
trespass because it was not supported by a warrant and no exigent 
circumstances existed.38  Because of the possible trespass and lack of 
emergency, the court questioned whether the officer was able to enter 
the defendant’s property constitutionally, simply because he saw a 
bag thrown from a window.39  Even if the officer was permitted to 
enter the property, a second search was conducted when the defend-
ant’s bag was opened and the gun was seized.40  While the bag itself 
was in plain view and subject to seizure, the search into the defend-
ant’s bag constituted a search of a closed container, which is typically 
impermissible unless the arrestee can reach its contents.41  The ar-
restee in Vernon B. undoubtedly could not reach the bag to seize its 
 
34 Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 1 (citing People v. Harris, 465 N.E.2d 36 (N.Y. 1984)).  This 
rule applies only if the evidence is obtained as the fruit of an unreasonable search or seizure.  
See generally WAYNE. R. LAFAVE, ET AL., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.1 -1.3 (4th ed. 2004). 
35 Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 1-2 (citing People v. King, 663 N.Y.S. 2d 610, 613 (App. 
Div. 2d Dep’t 1997)). 
36 See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984) (holding that searches or seizures 
inside the home are presumptively unreasonable and that the government must prove the 
presence of exigent circumstances to overcome this presumption). 
37 Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 2 (holding unclear). 
38 Id. at 2.  The court cited to United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), and People v. 
Abruzzi, 385 N.Y.S.2d 94 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1976), to support this conclusion.  Id.  In 
Jones, the court held that trespassing with an attempt to find something constituted a search 
by police.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951.  In Abruzzi, the court held that looking into private prop-
erty and then entering constituted a search warranting Fourth Amendment protection.  
Abruzzi, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 97. 
39 Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 2. 
40 Id. at 2. 
41 Id. (citing People v. Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that the plain view 
doctrine permitting warrantless seizures of evidence did not apply because the defendant 
could not reach the container, and because the contents could have been secured until a war-
rant was issued)). 
6
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contents because it had been thrown from a window, creating the 
possibility that the gun’s seizure was unconstitutional.42  As the entry 
into the property and the subsequent seizure of the defendant’s bag 
and gun provided the only evidence to believe the defendant commit-
ted the crime, if found to be seized unlawfully they would be sup-
pressed and the prosecution would be terminated.43  A careful exami-
nation of the facts and a hesitancy to conduct DNA searches absent 
probable cause, as was done in Vernon B., are important because the 
interest in one’s body is one of the most closely guarded areas in all 
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.44 
III.  FEDERAL PRECEDENT DICTATES THAT DNA SAMPLES ARE 
PROTECTED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
DNA research is just coming out if its infancy in relation to 
the law.45 This is understandable considering that the human genome 
was not sequenced until 1953,46 and DNA evidence use did not be-
come generally accepted in New York until the 1990s.47  Therefore, a 
discussion of the Fourth Amendment’s bodily intrusion precedent, as 
it applies to DNA, requires explanation through other types of sei-





43 Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 2 (“Accordingly, if the bag, pistol and ammunition had been 
illegally seized, they will be suppressed, and there would be no probable cause . . . inci-
dentally, terminating this prosecution.”). 
44 “The importance of informed, detached, and deliberate determinations of the issue 
whether or not to invade another’s body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and 
great.”  Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. 
45 DNA was not used in criminal investigations until the mid 1980s, and since that time 
numerous technological advancements have occurred.  Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third 
Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009). 
46 James Watson and Francis Crick first published their famous determination of the dou-
ble-helix structure of DNA in 1953.  James D. Watson & Francis H.C. Crick, A Structure for 
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737-38 (1953). 
47 See Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451 (holding that DNA evidence is generally accepted and reli-
able among the scientific community, and passes the Frye test). 
48 See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (discussing bodily intrusion searches of the blood); 
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (discussing bodily intrusions searches for evidence 
under the nails); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) 
(discussing bodily intrusion searches of urine and deep-lung breath); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 
F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 2005) (using the above mentioned cases to determine whether the seizure 
of DNA constitutes a search). 
7
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A. Setting the Standard for a Heightened Bodily 
Interest 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the field of law 
now governing DNA samples for the first time in 1966 when it de-
cided Schmerber v. California.49  In Schmerber, the defendant was 
receiving medical treatment in a local hospital for injuries suffered 
while driving when the police arrested him and directed physicians to 
take blood samples.50  The samples were later tested and found to 
contain blood alcohol levels above the legal limit.51  Based on this ev-
idence the court convicted the defendant of driving while intoxicat-
ed.52  The Court affirmed the state court’s conviction53 and held that 
taking the blood samples and introducing them at trial did not violate 
any of the defendant’s constitutional rights.54 
The Court in Schmerber reasoned that the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment is not to prevent searches, but to protect people 
against intrusions made in an unreasonable manner.55  Therefore, be-
cause the protection of “human dignity” is an extension of the Fourth 
Amendment, any attempt to gather evidence that protrudes “beyond 
the surface of the body” constitutes a search garnering the full protec-
tion of the Constitution, and a reasonableness evaluation must be 
conducted.56  To determine the reasonableness of a search under the 
Fourth Amendment, the nature and depth of an intrusion on the indi-
vidual’s privacy interests must be balanced against the legitimate 
governmental interests that intrusion promotes.57  Because the indi-
vidual interest in personal dignity is so important in the Court’s view, 
the balance of reasonableness test requires that the seizure of the per-
 
49 Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757. 
50 Id. at 758. 
51 Id. at 758-59. 
52 Id. at 759. 
53 Id. 
54 See generally Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768 (holding that the seizure of physiological ev-
idence from the defendant’s body did not violate the privilege against self incrimination pro-
vided by the Fifth Amendment, that the search into the body was permitted by the Fourth 
Amendment, and that the defendant’s Due Process rights and Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel were not violated). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 769-70. 
57 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (holding that “the permissibility of a 
particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s 
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”). 
8
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son be conducted on probable cause58 and that authorities demon-
strate a clear indication that relevant evidence will be found.59  Addi-
tionally, the methods used to obtain the evidence must be reasonable 
in both the extent of the intrusion created by a particular procedure on 
the individual’s interests in privacy and bodily integrity, and in the 
specific way that the procedure threatens the individual’s safety or 
health.60 
Applying this test, the Court in Schmerber found that the of-
ficer’s suspicions about the defendant’s intoxication, such as his 
glassy, bloodshot eyes and “similar symptoms of drunkenness,” were 
highly relevant.61  These symptoms of intoxication justified not only 
his arrest but also presented a clear indication that his blood would 
contain evidence of intoxication.62  Likewise, the Court held that 
blood tests in general were reasonable in terms of the defendant’s in-
terests in privacy and bodily integrity because they are a common-
place and minimally invasive procedure.63  In addition, the blood test 
did not unreasonably endanger the defendant’s health or safety be-
cause it was conducted in a medically appropriate manner.64  The 
holding in Schmerber is important in the DNA search context be-
cause it established a heightened privacy interest over the body and 
fashioned a unique test of review for bodily searches.65  However, it 
is also important because blood tests, a common and accurate method 
of obtaining DNA samples, were, as a practice, specifically held to 
constitute a reasonable means of conducting a search.66 
 
58 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768. 
59 Id. at 769-70 (“The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amend-
ment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be 
obtained . . . [thus requiring] a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found.”). 
60 Id. at 770-71 (noting that “the test chosen was a reasonable one” with regard to the bod-
ily integrity concerns, specifically when performed with regard to the safety concerns).  See 
also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (holding that conducting surgery to remove a bul-
let was unreasonable in light of the need for general anesthesia, which affected the safety 
concerns and the need for exploratory probing to locate the bullet, which affected bodily in-
tegrity concerns, when weighed against the government’s interest and vast array of alterna-
tive evidence). 
61 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at at 769. 
62 Id. at 770 (“[T]he facts which established probable cause . . . also suggested the re-
quired relevance and likely success of a test of petitioner’s blood for alcohol.”). 
63 Id. at 771. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 767-68. 
66 See Wesley, 633 N.E.2d at 440 (discussing the long standing use and value of blood 
tests as a means of establishing DNA, for purposes of establishing paternity, and holding that 
9
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B.  Minimally Invasive Intrusions Still Constitute 
Searches 
The Schmerber test of reasonableness requires an analysis of 
the effects and intrusiveness of a search on an individual’s health and 
safety.67  Schmerber, however, only discussed blood tests.68  DNA 
samples can be obtained in several other ways, such as through 
buccal swabs or hair samples.69  These methods are much less physi-
cally invasive than a blood test.70  Because of their less invasive na-
ture, the question of what degree of constitutional protection applies 
to these less invasive procedures, if any, remains in debate.71  How-
ever, there is additional Supreme Court precedent, most notably Cupp 
v. Murphy,72 that has been relied on to suggest that less invasive 
DNA seizure techniques are still protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment.73 
In Cupp, the Court addressed the constitutionality of minimal-
ly invasive bodily search procedures.  The defendant was convicted 
of murdering his wife;74 the victim was strangled to death in her 
home, and numerous lacerations and abrasions were found on her 
throat.75  The presence of these lacerations implied that the attacker 
would undoubtedly have evidence of the victim’s blood under his 
 
the use of blood samples for establishing a person’s genetic identity was acceptable as evi-
dence in criminal prosecutions). 
67 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. 
68 Id. at 771-72 (excluding minimally invasive searches into the body conducted outside a 
medical facility from this holding, but suggesting they would constitute searches, and require 
the same careful analysis). 
69 A buccal swab requires that a cotton swab be placed into a person’s mouth, and then 
run along his or her cheek, and a hair sample requires that only a few hairs be plucked from 
the scalp.  Polanco, supra note 11, at 502-03. 
70 Unlike the buccal swab or hair sample procedure, a blood test requires that a needle 
physically pierce the skin.  Id. at 501. 
71 Compare Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. at 55 (holding that the seizure of saliva for the purpos-
es of examining a defendant’s DNA constituted the definition of a search under Schmerber, 
as it was literally inside the body), with Owens, 2006 WL 3725547, at *6 (reasoning that be-
cause DNA can be voluntarily separated, for example through expectorating, it is more akin 
to a characteristic constantly exposed to the public, and there is no Fourth Amendment pro-
tection for these characteristics, as is there is no expectation of privacy over what one know-
ingly exposes to the public). 
72 412 U.S. 291 (1973). 
73 See, e.g., Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp at 52 (discussing the relevance of Cupp, 412 U.S. 291, 
and Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, to minimally intrusive DNA seizures). 
74 Cupp, 412 U.S. at 292. 
75 Id. 
10
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fingernails from scratching her during the struggle.76  Officers 
promptly called the defendant in for questioning and noticed a dark 
spot, resembling blood, on his finger.77  Officers asked permission to 
scrape for samples under his fingernails, but the defendant refused 
and attempted to hide his hands.78  The defendant then began to 
scrape under the nails himself with a key from his pocket, and it was 
then that officers proceeded to take the samples over his protest.79 
The Court held that this seizure, however minimal, implicated 
the Fourth Amendment and the Schmerber balancing test because it 
affected the defendant’s “personal security.”80  Applying this test, the 
Court found that the officers undoubtedly had probable cause to sus-
pect the defendant had committed the crime because of the way he 
hid his hands.81  This action, when combined with the lacerations on 
the victim’s neck, presented the clear indication required to believe 
relevant evidence would be found.82  The Court was also satisfied 
that the procedure was conducted reasonably because the intrusion 
required to scrape material from under a nail was limited and did not 
deeply affect the defendant’s privacy interests or his health and safe-
ty.83  This holding is highly informative for the DNA context because 
a variety of DNA seizure methods, such as buccal swabbing84 or hair 
sampling85 entail minimal invasions on the body but under Cupp’s 





79 Cupp, 412 U.S. at 296. 
80 Id. at 294. 
81 Id. at 296. 
82 Id. at 295. 
83 Id. at 296. 
84 “Swabbing the inside of someone’s mouth with a soft pad to collect saliva or skin cells 
is an effective way to collect DNA.”  Polanco, supra note 11, at 526. 
85 While hair is analogized to fingerprints, and exempted from the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment as was done in In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1982), the de-
gree of intrusion of the subsequent analysis of DNA taken from the hair should bring this 
search within the confines of the Fourth Amendment.  See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (finding 
a privacy interest in private medical facts revealed during the analysis of bodily material).  
Hair sampling should also be considered a search because while hair may be constantly ex-
posed to the public, the root is within the body, fitting the Schmerber definition, and the hair 
must be scientifically analyzed for any evidentiary use which distinguishes it from finger-
prints.  See Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA:  The Fourth Amendment and 
Genetic Privacy, 100 N.W. U. L. REV. 857, 868 (2006) (arguing that constantly exposed 
characteristic theories of the Fourth Amendment, like those advanced in Rosahn, should not 
include genetic privacy concerns). 
11
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tiny.86 
C.  Genetic Privacy Interests Make DNA a Search 
An analysis of the effect of an intrusion on individual interests 
in privacy and bodily integrity is also required as part of the 
Schmerber balancing test.87  Genetic privacy is one example of a se-
rious concern affecting these individual interests.88  Nevertheless, 
DNA is frequently mischaracterized and considered to be just a 
means of identification not affecting this interest.89  However, DNA 
includes private medical facts, and the Court addressed concerns 
about the protection afforded to medical privacy in Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executives Association.90  In Skinner, the Federal Railroad 
Administration (“FRA”) enacted a program that enabled supervisors 
to take breath, blood, and urine samples from any railroad employee 
involved in an accident.91  The Court ultimately concluded that this 
practice did not violate the Fourth Amendment,92 but undoubtedly in-
volved a search.93 
The Court in Skinner reasoned that such practices were so in-
trusive on personal liberty and bodily integrity94 that they deserved 
Fourth Amendment protection because they constituted physical 
 
86 See Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (extending Cupp and Schmerber to include non-surgical in-
trusions that invade on personal security); see also Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. at 55 (holding that 
minimal intrusions for DNA implicate the Fourth Amendment) (citing Cupp, 412 U.S. at 
295). 
87 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. 
88 DNA samples undoubtedly contain an enormous amount of information that a person 
would have an interest is keeping private.  Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. at 55. 
89 See, e.g., Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 670 (classifying DNA use as a means of identification 
only).  But see DNA Forensics, Oak Ridge National Lab, http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/ 
Human_Genome/elsi/forensics.shtml#4 (last visited June 4, 2013) (discussing how a genetic 
blueprint, like DNA, can only provide limited additional information to identity at this time, 
but the science is expanding, and some of the material available now, is something which 
individuals could expect to keep private, such as susceptibility to disease).  DNA samples 
also provide an opportunity for nefarious uses, that other means of identification do not.  
Andrew Pollack, DNA Evidence Can Be Fabricated, Scientists Show, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 
2009. 
90 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
91 Id. at 604. 
92 Id. at 634. 
93 Id. at 617 (“These intrusions [for blood, urine, and breath samples] must be deemed 
searches under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
94 Id. (“The ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a fur-
ther invasion of the tested employee’s privacy interests.”). 
12
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searches of a person’s body95 and therefore had to be protected by the 
amendment’s reasonableness standard.  The interest in bodily integri-
ty was implicated because the FRA’s procedures would reveal a host 
of medical facts about the employee that he or she would undoubted-
ly want to keep private.96  The protection of private medical facts, 
even without serious physical intrusion such as surgery, is what, by 
extension to the DNA context, makes Skinner so relevant.97  The 
Eastern District of New York and some commentators even consider 
Skinner to be dispositive on the issue of whether DNA constitutes a 
search.98  Many DNA seizures today focus on attempts to seize only 
identity information in an effort to skirt the protections created by 
Skinner to protect private medical information,99 but the door must 
remain open to considerations of whether any private medical facts or 
undiscovered scientific considerations will affect the reasonableness 
of the intrusion created by a DNA seizure.100 
 
 
95 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616. 
96 Id. at 617 (“[C]hemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private 
medical facts . . . .”).  The invasion on the privacy associated with the act of urinating also 
weighed in on the Court’s decision to consider these practices searches.  Id. 
97 “[E]ven the smallest penetration of the body will yield the entirety of a person’s genetic 
information.”  Joh, supra note 85.  This genetic information can reveal “insights into many 
intimate aspects of people . . . including susceptibility to particular diseases, legitimacy of 
birth, and perhaps predispositions to certain behaviors and sexual orientation.”  DNA Foren-
sics, supra note 89.  The disclosure of these facts undoubtedly implicates the private facts 
discussed in Skinner. 
98 See Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. at 54 (holding the privacy interest found in Skinner is an es-
sential component of why DNA must be considered a fully intrusive search); see Polanco, 
supra note 11, at 507 (“Skinner stands for the proposition that an analysis of biological mate-
rial that reveals no private information would not qualify as a search for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment.”); See Joh, supra note 85, at 872 (reasoning that Skinner’s holding that 
subsequent analysis of the sample constitutes a search, applies to DNA). 
99 See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c(3)(a) (“[A] sample appropriate for DNA testing to 
determine identification characteristics . . . .”). 
100 Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 669 (“The junk DNA that is extracted has, at present, no known 
function, except to accurately and uniquely establish identity.  Although science may some-
day be able to unearth much more information about us through our junk DNA.”).  This junk 
DNA, however, provides additional personal information such as susceptibility to disease.  
See DNA Forensics, supra note 89.  Today, junk DNA can undoubtedly be used to fabricate 
evidence, indicating the time has arrived for even identity DNA to be subject to full protec-
tions.  See Pollack, supra note 89. 
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IV. THE MINORITY VIEW:  DNA SEARCHES WARRANT LITTLE 
OR NO FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
If the individual interest in privacy is lessened, or the proce-
dures of the search entail a lesser intrusion, the government would be 
permitted to conduct that search under a less protective standard than 
probable cause.101  These lower protections are warranted because cit-
izens would essentially be deemed to have less fear of the “random or 
arbitrary acts of the government.”102  Even in these situations, courts 
have still required a reasonable, articulated suspicion about the value 
of the search.103  Relying on this lower standard, the Western District 
of New York and some commentators have argued that the individual 
privacy interest maintained over DNA is so decreased that the full 
protections of the Fourth Amendment may not be entirely necessary, 
or that Fourth Amendment protection may not be necessary at all.104 
A.  Why We Do Not “Abandon” Our DNA 
The abandonment theory is one view advanced in support of 
lower standards for the seizure of DNA evidence.  This view, enunci-
ated in United States v. Owens,105 asserts that humans essentially dis-
card their DNA so frequently through various means such as cough-
ing, chewing gum, or even licking a stamp, that there is a very limited 
expectation of privacy over it.106  In Owens, the defendant, while flee-
ing the scene after robbing a bank, abandoned a sweatshirt which had 
male DNA on it.107  Fingerprints obtained from the bank matched a 
sample of the defendant’s fingerprints maintained in a national data-
base, and relying on this match the prosecution sought an order com-
 
101 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 (“When the balance of interests precludes insistence on a 
showing of probable cause, we have usually required ‘some quantum of individualized sus-
picion’ before concluding that a search is reasonable.”) (quoting United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)). 
102 Id. at 622. 
103 Id. at 624. 
104 See, e.g., Owens, 2006 WL 3725547 (discussing the applicability of reasonable suspi-
cion, and advancing a lowering of the DNA privacy interest on an abandonment theory); see 
also Justin A. Alfano, Look What Katz Leaves Out:  Why DNA Challenges The Scope Of The 
Fourth Amendment, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1017 (2005) (arguing a lowering of the DNA pri-
vacy interest on the theory the physical and privacy intrusions associated with DNA are min-
imal, if not nonexistent). 
105 Owens, 2006 WL 3725547. 
106 Id. at *6. 
107 Id. at *3. 
14
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pelling the defendant to provide a saliva swab to be examined for the 
purposes of matching his DNA to the abandoned sweatshirt.108 
The court in Owens held that instead of probable cause, a rea-
sonable suspicion about the probative value of a DNA seizure is the 
required standard the prosecution must meet in order to compel a de-
fendant to submit a buccal swab.109  In doing so, the court distin-
guished several seemingly dispositive cases as well.110  The court 
conceded that the principle created in Skinner, namely that a practice 
of gathering evidence does not need to involve a surgical intrusion to 
constitute a search when the search reveals private medical facts, ap-
plied to DNA.111 
However, the court distinguished DNA from the evidence 
searched in Skinner by examining the way humans interact with their 
DNA.112  The court reasoned that DNA molecules in a variety of the 
internal fluids in which humans carry them are “readily and involun-
tarily separated from the human body.”113  DNA collection is there-
fore distinguishable from the urine samples in Skinner, which were 
removed through urinating, a bodily function that has long been re-
garded as a private and protected act.114  In the court’s reasoning, the 
voluntary abandonment of DNA is so powerful it diminishes the in-
dividual privacy interest over DNA so greatly that this action alone 
distinguishes DNA samples from the samples obtained in Skinner.115 
One commentator has argued that this abandonment principle 
can be expanded, and DNA removed from the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections entirely because of recent technological 
advancements.116  DNA samples can now be obtained through the 
application of a sticky patch to the skin, which peels off dead skin 
 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at *16. 
110 Owens, 2006 WL 3725547, at *13. 
111 Id. at *10. 
112 Id. at *6 (noting that “DNA evidence is distinguishable as it is readily and involuntari-
ly separated from the human body . . . [it] may be obtained . . . from various sources, includ-
ing blood . . . semen . . . saliva, urine, hair, skin or . . . bones and teeth . . . [or] articles of 
clothing, cigarette butts, chewing gum, envelopes, [and] stamps”). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at *10 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617) (recognizing the degree of privacy tradi-
tionally afforded to the act of urination). 
115 Owens, 2006 WL 3725547, at *13 (“The cases . . . overlook the critical fact that one’s 
DNA is routinely held out to the public.”). 
116 Alfano, supra note 104, at 1031. 
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cells containing the DNA sequence.117  This practice eliminates any 
physical intrusion protected by Cupp and would remove DNA entire-
ly from the protections of Skinner.118  Without the protections afford-
ed to a physical intrusion and any protections afforded to private ge-
netic information, the seizure of DNA by sticky patch is arguably 
similar to taking a copy of an exposed and partially abandoned char-
acteristic, such as a person’s fingerprint.119 
However, the abandonment theory overlooks a key distinc-
tion: when a human leaves DNA behind in his everyday life, it is not 
the same as surrendering DNA for evidentiary purposes.  This dis-
tinction garners support from a careful reading of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Cupp.  In Cupp, the defendant walked into the po-
lice station with evidence literally on his hands in the form of a blood 
stain in plain view.120  However, the search in Cupp did not occur un-
til after police seized and analyzed this evidence.121  The holding, 
which delayed the moment that the search occurred until the scien-
tific analysis was conducted, implies that an additional, protected ex-
pectation of privacy exists for evidence when its incriminating char-
acter is not visible to the naked eye.122  This shows that there is an 
interest in keeping DNA from being scientifically analyzed, even 
though there may not be an interest in keeping the DNA within the 
body.123  This is a distinction most people undoubtedly understand, 
 
117 Id. 
118 Skinner, 489 U.S. 602.  See Alfano, supra note 104, at 1031 (arguing that frequent 
abandonment of DNA, and the attempt to seize identity only DNA eliminates DNA from the 
protections of Skinner). 
119 Skinner, 489 U.S. 602.  Fingerprints have long been distinguished because they are 
constantly exposed to the public, are placed on all surfaces the individual comes into contact 
with, and reveal nothing but the identity of the individual.  Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 
721, 727 (1969).  These characteristics imply that the seizure of fingerprints creates a mini-
mal intrusion and may be conducted on lower standards of suspicion.  Id. 
120 Cupp, 412 U.S. at 292. 
121 Id. at 295. 
122 See LAFAVE, supra note 34, at § 2.6 (arguing that Cupp supports a distinction on these 
grounds, that even though evidence may be plainly exposed, as was the blood spot on the 
defendant’s hand in Cupp, that the subsequent microscopic analysis, constituted a second 
search, one that defendant had an increased expectation of privacy over, and that interfered 
with his bodily security).  While the average person may recognize their DNA is placed on a 
stamp, they also understand that the DNA cannot be identified, or even seen, without sophis-
ticated scientific technology, and they would have an expectation that analysis would not 
occur, negating any decrease in their expectation of personal privacy over DNA.  Id. 
123 Compare id. (arguing DNA is protected from analysis by a valid privacy interest), with 
Owens, 2006 WL at 3725547, at *6 (arguing the mere separation of DNA eliminates almost 
all privacy interests)   See also infra Part B (discussing how the analysis of DNA is signifi-
16
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particularly in today’s society where popular media makes it quite 
clear that DNA searches are going to be analyzed as evidence for the 
purposes of prosecuting crimes.124  The way in which humans interact 
with and dispose of DNA, therefore, does not justify lowering the 
protections provided to DNA.  In actuality, it implies that precedent 
requires DNA to be considered a search warranting the full protec-
tions of probable cause. 
 
B.  Genetic Privacy and Identity:  DNA Is Not a 
Fingerprint Anymore 
An analogy to fingerprints is commonly used by those argu-
ing that DNA should be excluded from the Fourth Amendment’s full 
protection.125  The analogy centers around the assumption that the 
portions of DNA seized are only relevant for the purpose of establish-
ing the identity of a perpetrator and do not expose any private medi-
cal facts.126  The analogy is also defended on the grounds that DNA 
serves only an identity function, and that its analysis is equally relia-
ble to the analysis of fingerprints.127  However, these arguments are 
weakened when considered in light of advances in DNA technology 
and an analysis of the current state of the forensic process. 
 
cantly more difficult and error prone, than the analysis of fingerprints). 
124 See, e.g., Nielsen Ratings Service:  Top Programs of 2011, http://blog.nielsen.com/ 
nielsenwire/media_entertainment/nielsens-tops-of-2011-television/ (listing two crime shows, 
which use DNA testing for evidentiary purposes among the top ten primetime television 
programs, and five crime shows, which occasionally use DNA testing for evidentiary pur-
poses, among the top ten recorded programs on television, for all of 2011. 
125 Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 671 (“The collection and maintenance of DNA information, 
while effected through relatively more intrusive procedures such as blood draws or buccal 
cheek swabs, in our view plays the same role as fingerprinting.”); Owens, 2006 WL 
3725547, at *13 (“DNA evidence may be obtained, [in a] somewhat analogous [way] to a 
fingerprint”).  Alfano, supra note 104, at 1031 (equating DNA with fingerprints). 
126 Alfano, supra note 104, at 1031-33 (arguing that DNA’s only difference from finger-
prints is the potential to reveal facts protected by Skinner, but rejecting this concern as mean-
ingless in light of the seizure of identity only DNA). 
127 See id. at 1032 (making the comparison between DNA and fingerprints while conced-
ing that core loci or microscopic portions of the DNA must be separated for the identity 
function of the two types of evidence to be equal).  This concession demonstrates that com-
plex scientific procedures are irrelevant to the comparison of DNA to fingerprints to propo-
nents of the fingerprint approach. 
17
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1. DNA and Fingerprints Are Not the Same 
The analysis of DNA evidence provides opportunities for un-
constitutional invasions of privacy that fingerprint analysis does 
not.128  An examination of these opportunities shows that comparing 
DNA to fingerprints is essentially a way around Skinner’s protections 
over private medical data.129  Taking the fingerprints of a suspect 
provides absolutely no possibility of intrusion into liberty interests 
whatsoever; fingerprinting merely serves to identify a suspect or 
place him at a certain location.130  Fingerprinting, therefore, deserves 
the lesser protections it has been afforded because it presents a signif-
icantly lower possibility of intrusion on personal liberty.131 
By comparison, while it is true that only identity DNA is ul-
timately analyzed when a seizure of DNA occurs,132 during the pro-
cess the entire DNA molecule is exposed, and this includes private 
medical facts protected by Skinner.133  Even if the facts of the case 
are not disclosed, those conducting the tests could still learn a variety 
of information about the defendant, such as particular genetic charac-
teristics like predisposition to disease, or even that a person suffers 
from a particular disease.134  Certain diseases that can now be identi-
fied include serious mental illnesses,135 and the Supreme Court has 
held, in other contexts, that the right to keep mental illness private is 
a vital function of the Constitution and that liberty is greatly impaired 
merely because of the stigma associated with suffering from such a 
 
128 See Maunel E. Nestle, Fingerprint Identification, 36 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 285, 
at 2 (2012) (defining fingerprints as a serious of loops, swirls, and ridges, which are unique 
of identifiers of identity, and nothing else). 
129 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (“[C]hemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a 
host of private medical facts.”).  The invasion on the privacy associated with the act of uri-
nating also weighed in on the Court’s decision to consider these practices searches.  Id. 
130 See, e.g., Davis, 394 U.S. at 727 (reasoning that very few liberty interests are invaded 
by the seizure of fingerprints, and they can be seized on a mere reasonable suspicion). 
131 No information, other than an individual’s fingerprint, is revealed when a fingerprint 
sample is taken.  Nestle, supra note 128, at 2. 
132 See Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 670 (interpreting the New York State DNA database as per-
mitting only the seizure of identity DNA from offenders).  See also N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-
c(3)(a) (“A sample appropriate for DNA testing to determine identification characteristics.”). 
133 DNA molecules are contained in the blood seized, and then the identity portions of the 
gene sequence are isolated.  National Institute of Justice, DNA Evidence:  Basics of Analyz-
ing, http://www.nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/basics/analyzing.htm. 
134 DNA Forensics, supra note 89. 
135 Mitchell, Blood Tests Could Reveal Bipolar Disorder, MSNBC Health Blog, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23337532/ns/health-mental_health/t/blood-test-could-reveal-
bipolar-disorder/#.UGsrCE1lFPc (last visited June 4, 2013). 
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condition.136  This exposure forces an individual to rely only on a 
technician’s discretion and the deterrent effect of possible statutory 
penalties to ensure that his or her private medical data is not ex-
posed.137  While genetic privacy concerns are somewhat assuaged by 
the use of identity-only DNA, which would only reveal the identity of 
the subject and no additional facts, these concerns are in no way 
eliminated.  The mere possibility that damaging private medical facts 
can be revealed justifies an explicit requirement that DNA be brought 
within the protections of Skinner and the Fourth Amendment to avoid 
an invasion of one’s privacy. 
2.  Identity-Only DNA:  It Is Not Just for 
Identity Anymore 
Another assertion made by those analogizing DNA to finger-
prints is that both serve no purpose other than identifying a specific 
individual.138  Any similarity between DNA and fingerprints has re-
cently been called into question, however, as a group of scientists in 
Israel recently fabricated DNA that can match any person in the 
world, using strands of identity-only DNA.139  According to scientists 
at the National Institute for Standards and Technology, the engi-
neered DNA and bodily fluids were remarkably accurate and similar 
to real samples.140  The fake DNA, which can be made by any “biol-
ogy undergraduate,” according to the study author, is made through 
either the identity DNA kept in a state database or a tiny sample of 
DNA obtained from a person through surreptitious means.141  This 
duplication, or, more appropriately, “forging” technology permanent-
ly separates DNA from fingerprints.  Not only is fingerprint forgery 
 
136 Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (finding that public revelation of 
mental illness can significantly impair one’s constitutional liberty interests in being free from 
social stigma). 
137 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-f (penalizing the unauthorized disclosure or use of DNA rec-
ords).  Contra Alfano, supra note 104, at 1031 (characterizing this fear as a simple mistrust 
of government authorities).  The fear rises above mistrust, as various constitutional protec-
tions are involved. 
138 See sources cited supra note 125 (compiling cases comparing the identity function of 
both DNA and fingerprints). 
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incredibly difficult to perform,142 but the comparison between DNA 
and fingerprints rests on the assumption that identity DNA is useless 
for any nefarious purpose.143 
Although forgeries are remote possibilities, the distinction be-
tween fingerprints and DNA grows even stronger when they are con-
sidered.  To illustrate, if a fingerprint analysis and a DNA compari-
son were presented to the fact-finder, the DNA report would have a 
higher persuasive value.144  This is because DNA is well regarded as 
a highly accurate form of identification, and because of this it is high-
ly persuasive to jurors,145 regardless of whether DNA actually de-
serves this reputation for reliability.146  Thus, the mere possibility of 
an incredibly persuasive - albeit forged - piece of evidence being in-
troduced at trial weakens the analogy to fingerprints due to the poten-
tial heightened impact it could have on the fact-finder.147  By exten-
sion, this increases the intrusion on both personal liberty and bodily 
control created by a DNA seizure because this technology shows that 
DNA is not simply a means of identifying individuals any longer.148  
It is essential now, in the face of potential forgery, to ensure that any 
DNA sample is collected through a court order and by medical pro-
fessionals adhering to strict medical and evidentiary protocols, rather 
than surreptitiously acquiring samples involuntarily left behind by a 
defendant.  Therefore, the argument that lower protections for DNA 
are warranted due to its identity function is adverse to the interests of 
justice for a defendant. 
 
142 See B. Geller, et al., Fingerprint Forgery-A Survey, J. FORENSIC SCI. 46(3) 731-33 
(2001) (discussing how few cases of fingerprint forgery exist). 
143 See sources cited supra note 125 (compiling cases equating fingerprints and identity 
DNA); Alfano, supra note 104, at 1031. 
144 See DAVID H. KAYE, ET AL., REFERENCE MANUAL FOR SCI. EVID. 129, 2011 WL 
7724255, 54 (3d ed.) (discussing the possibility that the dense nature of DNA expert testi-
mony makes it seem more persuasive than it actually is). 
145 One author suggests the success of DNA as a persuasive tool is due in part by televi-
sion dramatization of DNA evidence, like CSI, and that jurors get confused by much of the 
math and science involved in DNA evidence.  See L. Meyers, The Problem with DNA, AM. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N MONITOR, Vol. 38 No. 6, at 52. 
146 See infra Part IV(c). 
147 Meyers, supra note 145. 
148 Undoubtedly the ultimate intrusion on bodily control, and personal liberty, would be if 
bodily fluids were used to frame an individual, as the Fourth Amendment in its plain lan-
guage protects the right of “people to be secure in their persons.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
Any possible type of bodily forensic evidence can be forged, including evidence such as sa-
liva, that merely establishes someone was in a particular location, and even semen, which 
could be used to implicate someone in a heinous sexual attack.  Pollack, supra note 89. 
20
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3.  DNA is Far More Difficult to Examine, 
Increasing the Possibility of Error 
The analogy to fingerprints rests on a third leg, that the subse-
quent analysis of the seized bodily items, namely DNA and finger-
prints, are inherently equally reliable.149  However, this assumption 
has been called into doubt in light of recent events bringing the value 
and reliability of DNA evidence into question, independent of any 
technological issues.  While the science of DNA is not open to ques-
tion, the fallibility of the technicians processing the associated sam-
ples should be.150  DNA samples can be contaminated quite easily by 
a variety of sources.151  These sources include chemical agents that 
are simply nearby when the sample is collected, or even trace DNA 
from the technician processing the sample.152  If a DNA sample is 
degraded in any way, the ensuing analysis can be fraught with inac-
curacy.153 
In addition, DNA technicians have also revealed that they 
have withheld or manipulated evidence for unknown reasons.154  
Technicians have even alluded to the fact that the labs themselves are 
filled with error, but do the best they can.155  This issue is particularly 
relevant in light of the recent issues at the Nassau County Evidence 
Lab, where errors forced the lab to retest over 3,000 scientific sam-
ples because of possible error, and 9,000 convictions were called into 
doubt.156  Errors like these indicate that even if the science is ac-
ceptable, the scientists performing the tests may still be acting in a 
way that makes the procedure unsafe and unreliable. 
In addition, simple clerical errors, such as misplacing or 
switching samples have been known to lead to wrongful convictions, 
 
149 See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c(5) (assigning value to identity only DNA). 
150 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (highlighting a variety of the 
issues that affect the forensic sciences, including fraudulent, and incompetent analysts). 
151 Laurel Beeler, DNA Identification Tests and the Courts, 63 WASH L. REV. 903, 921 
(1988) (detailing the possibility of bacteria infiltrating and affecting a DNA sample). 
152 Id. 
153 Polanco, supra note 11, at 526 (showing some of the errors presented in police conduct 
in handling a DNA sample). 
154 John Solomon, Conviction Tossed on FBI Lab Misconduct, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 
27, 2003. 
155 Id. 
156 Frank Eltman, Nassau County Shuts Down Crime Lab, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011. 
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an issue that arises not from the science of DNA but from the human 
nature of the technicians testing it.157  Comparing these issues to fin-
gerprints, DNA testing relies heavily on these questionable and com-
plicated procedures, whereas the analysis of fingerprints does not.158  
The greater degree of difficulty associated with examining DNA fur-
ther weakens the analogy to fingerprints and increases the degree of 
intrusion created by a DNA search. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Should the threshold determination be made that the search 
was supported by probable cause; the Kings County Criminal Court 
will require the defendant, Vernon B., to submit a DNA sample.159  
This DNA seizure and any subsequent uses of that DNA evidence, 
have a significant impact on his “bodily integrity.”  However, the Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment presents a 
safeguard for his bodily interests, and has implemented procedures to 
protect against any mischief that may result from the use of this evi-
dence and any ensuing impairments on liberty.160  That protection is 
probable cause, a standard that channels the inquiry towards the 
strength of the evidence and helps establish whether conducting a 
search is reasonable, despite the intrusions that are created.161  This 
safeguard of probable cause is required in the context of DNA be-
cause of the high likelihood of unreasonable intrusions, and the ever-
changing nature and degree of these possible intrusions in relation to 
our understanding of DNA science.162 
Despite this important safeguard, some argue that because 
DNA is involuntarily abandoned in our everyday lives, it therefore 
 
157 Ryan McDonald, Juries and Crime Labs:  Correcting the Weak Links in the DNA 
Chain, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 356 (illustrating the difficulties crime labs face in maintain-
ing DNA samples). 
158 Simply by their relevant natures this fact is inferred, comparison fingerprinting merely 
requires an analysis of the similarities between two enlarged photographs.  Geller, supra 
note 142, at 731.  Whereas, DNA requires microscopic analysis and the isolation of incredi-
bly complex and individual parts of the human cell structure.  DNA Forensics, supra note 
89. 
159 35 Misc. 3d 1241(a). 
160 Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 652, 678-79 (Lynch, J., concurring). 
161 Id. at 680. 
162 The Kings County Criminal Court revisited the issue of whether the police acted law-
fully when seizing the gun from Vernon B.’s home, and determined that they had.  Vernon 
B., 954 N.Y.S. 2d 835, 835 (Crim. Ct. 2012).  On November 19, 2012 the court granted the 
People’s motion for a DNA order.  Id. at 836. 
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does not warrant any type of protection.163  A careful reading of prec-
edent shows, however, that regardless of this involuntariness an indi-
vidual does not abandon the right to protect that DNA from analysis, 
nor does he surrender the privacy associated with medical facts dis-
cernible from that sample.164  Others analogize DNA to a fingerprint 
to further the argument against protection, arguing that DNA serves 
no purpose other than to identify an individual.165  However, the as-
sociated science clearly shows DNA consists of something more; it is 
the blueprint to life containing almost every private medical fact 
about us, going far beyond mere identifying characteristics unlike a 
simple picture of the outside of a finger.166  Other distinctions be-
tween DNA and fingerprints, such as the inherent possibility of nefar-
ious use and the differing levels of complexity required for analysis, 
create an insurmountable divide.  This divide, which is founded on 
legal precedent, scientific principles, recent scientific developments, 
and common sense distinctions between types of forensic evidence, 
all outlined above, truly demonstrates why DNA must be protected in 







163 Owens, 2006 WL 3725547, at *6 (reasoning that because DNA can be voluntarily sep-
arated, for example through expectorating, it is more akin to a characteristic constantly ex-
posed to the public, and there is little Fourth Amendment protection for these characteristics, 
as is there is a diminished expectation of privacy over what one knowingly exposes to the 
public). 
164 See generally Cupp, 412 U.S. 291; Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; and infra sections III(b) and 
III(c). 
165 Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 671 (majority opinion) (“The collection and maintenance of 
DNA information, while effected through relatively more intrusive procedures such as blood 
draws or buccal cheek swabs, in our view plays the same role as fingerprinting.”); Owens, 
2006 WL 3725547, at *13 (“DNA evidence may be obtained, [in a] somewhat analogous 
[way] to a fingerprint”).  Alfano, supra note 104, at 1031 (equating DNA with fingerprints). 
166 See DNA Forensics, supra note 89 (discussing how a genetic blueprint, like DNA, can 
only provide limited additional information to identity at this time, but the science is expand-
ing, and some of the material available now, is something which individuals could expect to 
keep private, such as susceptibility to disease). 
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